

## VSP Public Comment

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**From:** gabrielle@dslextre.me.com  
**Sent:** Tuesday, June 28, 2005 12:25 PM  
**To:** Secretary of State, Constituent Affairs  
**Cc:** McDannold, Bruce  
**Subject:** Standards for AVVPAT

Should California reject the proposed Diebold system? Vote=Yes

As a network admin I'm appalled at the lack of security of the Diebold system. The machines upload to a Microsoft Access Database that is NOT password protected if you go to the install directory. The audit trail that comes with MS Access is even DISABLED, you can make changes to peoples vote just by double clicking on a Microsoft Office file and changing the entries... I am taken back by law maker's complete lack of research on the technology they are implementing. Please don't just take the vendor's word that the system is safe. Get an independent review by another technology firm. Talk to someone that knows computers and doesn't stand to benefit from the transaction. We are all depending on you to make our votes count.

Ms. Gabrielle Phillips  
201 S. Francisca  
Redondo Beach, CA 90277

Citizen Proposed Standards:

The AVVPAT shall be printed on single sheet non-thermal at least 16 pound paper, one record of vote per sheet.

Every recorded vote, no matter how recorded, shall have a AVVPAT copy.

The AVVPAT record of the vote shall be printed in a minimum of 12 point font.

The AVVPAT shall be printed and organized to be easily read by both the voter and election officials.

The AVVPAT during the 1% manual audit and any recount shall be physically verified and hand counted only.

The recorded vote choices on the AVVPAT shall not be audited or recounted by automatic or electronic methods.

There shall not be a method by which any particular voting record can be connected to any particular voter.

Any AVVPAT spoiled or rejected by a voter because of a voting system error shall not be counted as a spoiled ballot under the two spoiled ballots limit.

No remote access to voting machines by wireless or internet.